In this case, the injury or damage is so severe and it's reasonably certain that the harm could have been foreseen that the law dispenses with the need to prove intent or mental state. The only issue is whether the party sued should pay the money award, or whether the party's employer should pay the money award.
INTENTIONAL TORT -- In this case, the injurer's intent must be proven, using a foreseeability test involving whether or not the injurer knowingly engaged in behavior that was substantially certain to bring about injury.
NEGLIGENCE -- In this case, intent or mental state do not matter as much as due diligence or standard of care matter. At issue is whether some inadvertent act or failure to act created an unreasonable risk to another member of society. Most states have three levels of negligence: (1) slight or mere (absence of foresight); (2) gross (reckless disregard); and (3) criminal. To be prosecuted under tort law for negligence usually requires at least level 2 since to be prosecuted for mere negligence requires considering foreseeability which would support charging the person with an intentional tort or not.
To reign in, or control, the litigation explosion, various forms of tort reform are in existence. Tort reform is controversial because of ideological differences over its necessity. Some argue that such reforms have a chilling effect on victims rights, and that most reforms favor the big corporations (by quashing legitimate claims, not just "frivolous" claims). Who's to say when a tort reform (like California's liability cap of $250,000 for "non-economic" damages, including death) starts to unjustly punish victims with legitimate claims? Also, who's to say if excessive litigation (the absence of tort reform) doesn't force corporations into due diligence and make our society safer? The US Supreme Court considered these questions somewhat in the following case:
| State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell et al. 538 US 408 (2003) |
| Curtis Campbell was a Utah man dissatisfied with the $50,000 policy limit of his auto insurance for an accident which was not his fault. He sued State Farm for bad faith, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. In state court, a jury was allowed to hear evidence of State Farm's refusal to settle similar cases in other states, and awarded Campbell $145 in punitive damages in addition to $1 million in compensatory damages. The case sustained appeal up to the Utah Supreme Court, and when the US Supreme Court took the case, it found that punitive damages of $145 million were excessive when compensatory damages were only $1 million, ruling that the Due Process Clause of the Constitution prohibits the imposition of grossly excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeaser.
Reasoning: Compensatory damages are intended to redress a plaintiff’s concrete loss, while punitive damages are aimed at the different purposes of deterrence and retribution. Punitive damages serve the same purpose as criminal penalties. However, because civil defendants are not accorded the same protections afforded criminal defendants, punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property, which is heightened when the decisionmaker is presented with evidence having little bearing on the amount that should be awarded. Thus, this Court has instructed courts reviewing punitive damages to consider (1) the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant’s misconduct, (2) the disparity between the actual or potential harm suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damages award, and (3) the difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases.
Majority opinion: Kennedy -- punitive damages pose an acute danger of arbitrary deprivation of property. Jury instructions typically leave the jury with wide discretion in choosing amounts, and the presentation of evidence of a defendant’s net worth creates the potential that juries will use their verdicts to express biases against big businesses, particularly those without strong local presences.
Dissents: Scalia & Thomas: "no such protections exist in the Due Process Clause" and Ginsberg: "the Court should not be involved with invalidating things clearly in the state's domain." |
