Following Contents quoted from “CRAWFORD’S STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION interpretation of Laws”
In General.—An examination of the
statutes of the various states reveals that it is a common legislative practice
to enact - the construction of statutes. Sometimes such rules will be made
applicable to all statutes; sometimes they will be applicable to specific
statutes or codes. But in either case, they seem to two predominating purposes:
(1) to declare what the law is, and (2) to correct a construction that seems
erroneous to the legislature
As is thus apparent, these rules
are important factors in the construction of statutes, and they are entitled to
consideration a statute to which they are applicable, is subjected to the process
of interpretation by the court.' In fact, in many instances, control the
construction.2 Nevertheless, if avoidable,
they should not be allowed to operate retrospectively if
thereby they will impair or destroy vested rights,3 although retroactive
operation is not necessarily seriously objectionable f no constitutional rights
are violated.4 On the other hand, prospective operation seems generally to be
unobjectionable,5 as is true with all legislation.
Yet, the power, as we have already stated,6 resting in the
legislature to prescribe legal definitions or to announce rules of construction,
cannot invade the field of the judiciary.7 This obviously would violate the
tri-parte theory of government and actually permit the legislature to exercise
the judicial power of interpretation_ Herein lies the danger of allowing
statutory rules of construction to operate retroactively. And besides, the same
danger exists where such rules are allowed to operate prospectively) if they
are regarded as absolutely binding upon the court. As a result, the proper
sphere of statutory rules of construction would seem simply to be that of an
indication, of the legislative intent or as merely constituting -a- source from
which the court may find some assistance in ascertaining the legislative
intent. It may be, however, that a statutory rule of construction will create a
problem of construction more difficult than the one which calls for resort to
the statutory rule. The statutory declaration may itself require construction.8
This factor alone would seem justify the judicial attitude that statutory rules
of construction' should not be absolutely binding upon the court but should be
simply as a source from. which to draw
assistance in determining the
legislative intent in a given case.
statute's meaning. But, the court in its effort to ascertain
whether a contrary meaning exists, may properly subject the declaratory statute
to a strict construction and refuse to give it a scope in excess of that.
clearly required by its language."Substantial Uniformity of General Statutory Rules of Construction. As will be hereafter revealed," a comparison of the provisions of the general interpretation statutes of the several, states reveals two or three interesting facts. In the first place, we find a remarkable trend toward uniformity. While the language may not always be the same, its import will be substantially identical. Indeed in a large number of states, the language will actually be the Other states, however, may have statutes which are more detailed or comprehensive in that more terms are defined or more rules of construction are announced. But regardless of their scope, will be impressed with the similarity of the most important provisions. A second fact of considerable interest is revealed by those pro-which declare the law. In many instances, such provisions simply state the rule Of law announced by the courts in their decisions, with the result that the general principles pertaining to the -reconstruction of statutes everywhere are in effect codified. In other words, the statutes will simply state the rules of law already declared and applied by the courts. Where this is the case, obviously, the statute has very little, if any, effect upon the judicial attitude.
Revival.-"First. The repeal of a statute shall not revive any previous statute except in case of the repeal of a statute, after it has become law, by the vote of the people, upon its submission by referendum petition.), 14
Retroactive Effect.-"Second. The repeal of a statute shall not affect any punishment, penalty, or forfeiture incurred before the repeal takes effect, or any suit, prosecution or proceeding pending at the time of the repeal for an offense committed, or for the recovery of a penalty, or forfeiture incurred, under the statute repealed." 15
Non-Technical and Technical Words.-"Third.
Words and phrases shall be construed according to the common and approved usage
of the language ; but technical words and phrases and such others as may have
acquired a peculiar and appropriate meaning in law shall be construed and
understood according to such meaning." 16
